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Fighting Fires in Testing Times:  
Exploring a Staged Response Hypothesis for Blame 
Management in Two Exam Fiasco Cases 
 
Christopher Hood, Will Jennings and Brian Hogwood, with Craig Beeston1
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper tests a 'staged-response’ hypothesis about the blame management 
strategies  of public officeholders facing blame firestorms in the media after serious 
failures in the public-exam system for school-leavers in Scotland in 2000 and England 
in 2002. The authors develop a method for systematic analysis and comparison of the 
behaviour of officeholders confronted with such firestorms and construct time series 
intervention models to estimate the impact of strategies upon the next day’s blame 
level. The findings do not fit the hypothesis precisely, but are consistent with the 
underlying thrust of theories of blame avoidance. The findings also raise questions 
over claims about the effectiveness of presentational strategies for managing blame, 
the idea that administrative delegation can protect ministers in parliamentary systems 
when being criticized for operational failures, and that the appointment of inquiries is 
used to put tricky issues into the political ‘long grass’.  
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Exam Crises, Blame-Avoidance and Staged Retreat 
 
Major fiascos in a central function of a key public service provide political scientists 
with important windows into blame-avoidance dynamics in modern politics and 
bureaucracy. How do officeholders (ministers, bureaucrats, regulators) behave when a 
media ‘firestorm’ breaks out over serious public-service mistakes that cannot 
plausibly be attributed to unforeseeable events alone? 
 
The ‘blame-avoidance’ perspective that has developed in political science, 
particularly since Kent Weaver’s (1986) seminal contribution, would lead us to expect 
that officeholders facing a media firestorm would follow a ‘staged rearguard action’ 
pattern, in which they abandon higher-level defensive positions only when such 
positions become untenable, moving at that point to lower-level defensive positions 
that come progressively closer to acceptance of culpability. 
 
Accordingly, this paper sketches out a simple style-phase model of blame-avoidance 
dynamics along those lines, and examines how far it fits the responses of 
officeholders to two similar public-service fiascos in the UK in the early 2000s. One 
is a major failure (producing missing and incorrect grades) of the public examination 
system for high-school-leavers in Scotland in the summer of 2000, and the other is a 
serious failure in the equivalent exam system for England two years later. In both 
cases the failure concerned a public service that affects a large and growing number of 
‘customers’ and requires for its successful operation the full and correct processing of 
increasingly complex data within a very narrow time-frame. In both cases the extent 
of the failures was uncertain at the outset, and it took some time before the smoke 
cleared and the numbers affected were established. And, also in both cases, the 
consequences of error or delay were substantial, avoidable and salient, since they 
involved major potential damage to the university entrance prospects of an entire 
cohort of school-leavers (including, in the English case, the Prime Minister’s son).  
 
We analyze the blame-avoidance dynamics in these two cases by exploring 
officeholder responses to approximately 100 days of blame in half-a-dozen selected 
tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, classifying their responses over time and 
comparing the observed response pattern with the staged-response style-phase model 
of blame-avoidance that was briefly referred to above and is developed in the next 
section. We find a loose fit with the style-phase model, in the sense that the pattern of 
responses by the various officeholders (bureaucratic and ministerial) involved in the 
two firestorms did have a tendency to admit both problem and responsibility only 
after passing through stages in which either problem or responsibility were not fully 
acknowledged. In both cases it took between two and three weeks from the onset of 
the media firestorm for government ministers to reach the point of full admission of 
both problem and responsibility. But the fit was loose both in the sense that something 
more – or other – than ‘problem denial’ was the opening stance in both cases, and that 
there were ‘aftershocks’ after cathartic episodes, such as ministerial resignations, in 
which another round of blame management began.    
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A Staged-Response Hypothesis for Blame-Avoidance 
 
The literature on blame-avoidance is scattered and diffuse, but at least three major 
strategies for officeholders can be distinguished from that literature, namely agency 
strategies (involving attempts to avoid blame by delegation or other ways of limiting 
formal responsibility), policy strategies (involving attempts to avoid blame by 
constructing policies or procedures that remove discretion or are otherwise designed 
to attract the least criticism) and presentational strategies (involving attempts to avoid 
blame by affecting public attitudes or perceptions, for instance by ‘spin’, excuses or 
justificatory arguments, in the face of actual or expected criticism) (see Hood 2002; 
Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Hood 2005). Whereas presentational strategies can be used 
before or after a ‘blame firestorm’ breaks out, agency and policy strategies need to be 
in place before the event if they are to deflect blame - a distinction sometimes 
expressed in separating ‘blame-avoidance’ from ‘blame management’ (see for 
instance McGraw (1991: 1135) who uses the latter term for after-the-fact blame 
limitation activity). Once a blame firestorm erupts, officeholders have to rely largely 
on presentational strategies, though they may revise policy and agency strategies for 
the future. 
 
However, presentational strategies can themselves take several forms. As Figure 1 
suggests, officeholders exposed to blame face a basic choice between denying or 
admitting the existence of some problem in the provision of the service for which they 
are responsible. Denying the existence of any problem implies there is no blame to be 
assigned2. However, if officeholders choose to admit there is a problem, the issue of 
blame necessarily arises and officeholders then face a further choice between denying 
or admitting responsibility for the problem. 
 
Figure 1: Blame-Avoidance Through Problem Denial and Responsibility Denial: 
Some Basic Choices for Officeholders 
  
“Crisis” 
Problem denial Problem admission 
Responsibility admission Responsibility denial 
 
 
Following the idea that officeholders’ presentational responses to crisis and fiasco 
will normally be dominated by considerations of blame-avoidance, the hypothesis to 
be explored here is that the basic options depicted in Figure 1 will tend to be adopted 
                                                 
2 As in Felstiner et al’s well-known ‘naming, blaming and claiming’ analysis of the stages of 
development in legal disputes, and in McGraw’s distinction between justifications and excuses 
(Felstiner at al 1980, McGraw 1991). 
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in a sequence of stages, as shown in Figure 2. The expectation is that officeholders 
facing media blame firestorms could normally be expected to stage their responses in 
the order of (1) problem denial, (2) problem admission but responsibility denial, and 
(3) both problem and responsibility admission. 
 
Figure 2: Blame-Avoidance Stances During Media Blame Firestorms: A Staged-
Retreat Hypothesis. (‘The staircase analysis’) 
Problem denial 
A1-  Pure denial 
A2-  Qualified  denial 
A3-  Denial plus   
        counter-attack 
Admit problem, not 
responsibility 
B1- Open stance  
B2- Claim others   
        responsible 
Level of 
defensiveness 
B3- Admit only limited 
       responsibility
Admit problem and 
take responsibility  
C1- Explanatory  
        stance 
C2- Institutional action 
C3- Admit personal  
       culpability 
t0           t1   t2   t3
Time in duration of firestorm 
 
 
We would expect problem denial to be the preferred initial position for would-be 
blame-avoiding officeholders since, as already noted, if it can be plausibly maintained 
that there is no (real) problem – that is, no significant avoidable loss, risk or harm – 
then the issue of blame cannot arise. So our expectation is that only if the problem 
denial stance is, or becomes, unfeasible, will officeholders choose a problem 
admission stance of some kind. And even then we might expect officeholders’ 
preferred initial position to be one in which problem admission is matched with 
responsibility denial (that is, claiming that blame has yet to be determined or that it 
lies elsewhere). And only if that position becomes untenable might we expect 
officeholders to move to a third and less politically palatable stage, namely admission 
both that there is a problem and that the officeholder has some degree of 
responsibility for it. 
 
In suggesting that blame-avoiding officeholders might ordinarily be expected to stage 
their responses to a blame firestorm in that sequence, we do not argue that every such 
firestorm will follow such a pattern. For some kinds of crisis, a stance of problem 
denial may be short-lived or altogether indefensible from the outset, so that 
officeholders are likely to move immediately to the ‘problem admission, 
responsibility denial’ phase. Similarly, we might expect some kinds of crisis never to 
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go beyond the stage of problem denial or of problem admission but denial of 
responsibility. Only if pressure is sustained over a period might we expect those more 
exposed defensive positions on the bottom-right corner of the map in Figure 2 to be 
reached. But if officeholders do in fact move straight to the stage of admitting 
responsibility, we would clearly need to modify the ideas discussed earlier of blame 
avoidance as a dominant bureaucratic and political imperative, and conclude that 
officeholder behaviour is better explained by other kinds of imperative. 
 
More tentatively, we can distinguish some different forms or variants of each of those 
three officeholder stances, which are described in Appendix 1 and summarized in 
Figure 2. For the problem denial stance, we can distinguish pure problem denial (in 
which no problem whatsoever is acknowledged by officeholders) from a more 
qualified type of problem denial (in which the existence of some problem is 
acknowledged, but accompanied by a denial that the problem in question is serious or 
significant, or by justificatory arguments to the effect that the problem is really part of 
a desirable change, for instance short-term pain for long-term gain). We can also 
distinguish simple problem denial of either type from the sort of problem denial that is 
accompanied by a counter-attack on those who assert there is a problem (for instance, 
in the form of allegations of ulterior political motives on the part of those raising the 
issue (see Kurtz 1998: 302), threats of sanctions against moles or whistle-blowers, 
attempts to shift the onus of proof from the accused to the critics).  
 
For the ‘problem admission but responsibility denial’ stance, we can similarly 
distinguish an open stance on who might be responsible (for instance, when some 
inquiry is set up to discover who might be to blame for the problem) from a stance 
definitely attributing responsibility (but to others, in the classic blame-shifting mode). 
Further, we can distinguish pure responsibility denial from a more qualified type of 
denial. Examples of qualified denial might include officeholders offering excuses or 
pleas of mitigation, accepting only technical rather than real responsibility, or only 
minor responsibility rather than serious culpability on their part.       
 
For the ‘problem and responsibility admission’ stance, we can distinguish the sort of 
response that ends with offering explanations of what went wrong from responses that 
invoke remedial action of some kind on the part of the officeholders’ organization 
(such as official apologies, compensatory action, staff dismissals or discipline). We 
can in turn distinguish both of those responses from that in which officeholders accept 
significant personal culpability for what went wrong, and offer some act of personal 
penitence or resignation (as for instance with US President Bill Clinton’s shift from 
his original ‘privacy’ stance to one of confessional contrition over the Lewinsky affair 
in 1998 (see Lee and Barton 2003)).  
 
Overall, the style-phase hypothesis we explore here, as depicted in Figure 2, is the 
idea that officeholders exposed to a continuing media firestorm will in general follow 
a ‘staged retreat under fire,’ moving from problem denial through problem admission 
and responsibility denial to problem and responsibility admission. We do not 
necessarily expect the different forms or variants (e.g. A1, A2, A3) of the three main 
types of response to come in any particular sequence, because there is no obvious 
logic that would allow us to posit those as logical stages of retreat.  
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Data, Cases and Method 
 
To explore the staged-response hypothesis of responses to blame, as set out in the 
previous section, we explore officeholders’ responses to approximately 100 days of 
media blame firestorms in the two exam-grading-fiasco cases mentioned earlier – that 
of Scotland in the summer of 2000 and of England in 2002. In both cases, the 
firestorms followed major avoidable errors potentially affecting the university 
entrance prospects of an initially unknown number of teenage school-leavers, 
resulting from administrative reorganization, IT developments, human error or 
inappropriate interventions. Both involved formal systems of ministerial 
responsibility to legislatures of which the ministers are members. Both involved 
Labour (or Labour-dominated) executives following though on policies begun under a 
previous Conservative government. And in both cases a key part of the problem arose 
from modularization of previously simpler examinations (meaning a much larger 
number of grades to be collected, processed and collated). Briefly, the chain of events  
is shown in Table 1 (page 7).  
 
In Scotland, significant errors occurred in the marking of ‘higher’ examinations 
(broadly equivalent to university entrance) in the summer of 2000. Those errors 
resulted from the interaction of three separate but simultaneous developments. One 
was the introduction of a new public-exam qualification at a higher level, which was 
called ‘Higher Still’. The second was the merger of two previously separate 
examination boards (Scotvec and SCE) into a single organization, and the third was 
the introduction of a new IT system to support the processing of exam results. 
According to a report produced later in 2000 on the Scottish Qualifications Authority, 
some 16,748 Scottish candidates out of a total of approximately 147,000 (and 
approximately 2.7 per cent of results) were affected by missing or incomplete data, 
leading to a fivefold increase in urgent appeals for university entrance (Deloitte and 
Touche 2000, sec 1.1 and 3.2.2). As Table 1 shows, at the beginning of August in that 
year, immediately before results were due to be notified to candidates, the 
bureaucratic agency responsible (the Scottish Qualifications Authority) informed the 
Scottish Executive (the executive arm of the then newly-established Scottish 
Parliament) that there were around 5,000 missing unit results affecting some 4,000 
candidates. But the eventual total proved to be much higher than that, and the 
problems quickly came to the attention of the news media as anxious students and 
their parents expressed their concerns3.   
 
In the case of England, problems with the A-Level public exams (broadly equivalent 
to university entrance) in the summer of 2002 were much slower in coming to light in 
media discussion than those experienced in Scotland, mainly because there were no 
missing results on the day that exam results were due to be notified to candidates. The 
problem in England, in contrast to the Scottish case, was not a failure of information 
management and processing producing missing or incomplete results, but rather 
confusion about the appropriate standards, producing the allegation that ‘grade 
boundaries’ of examination results, particularly for a newly-introduced ‘A2’ 
component of the examinations, had been altered at the behest of the heads of 
England’s three examination boards to an extent greater than those officially recomm- 
                                                 
3 For accounts of the problem and how it was handled, see Raffe, Howieson and Tinklin (2000) and 
Education and Culture Committee (Scottish Parliament) (2000). 
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Table 1: A Brief Chronology of the Two Cases (Highlighted date = ‘Day 0’) 
 
Scotland 2000 England 2002 
28 Jun: SQA chief executive claims SQA is 
on course for 10 August deadline 
19 Jun: Five-year review of QCA 
recommends unchanged function & status 
 26 Jul: unminuted meeting between chair of 
QCA and chief execs of exam boards 
interpreted by exam boards as pressure to 
contain increase in awards of top grades 
9 Aug: SQA press release claims successful 
delivery of results, but at press conference 
SQA announces results for 1,200 candidates 
are missing. Minister for Children and 
Education announces review 
 
10 August: Results due 15 August: Results date 
12 Aug: SQA Chief Executive 'resigns'  
13 Aug: SQA announces validation check  
18 Aug: SQA announces 5,000 (5%) of 
Higher and CYYS affected by incomplete 
data 
 
20 Aug:  SQA announces 16,700 pupils' 
results (2.7%) inaccurate or incomplete 
  
30 Aug: SQA Head of Operations suspended 
and Director of Rewards 'relinquished his 
position' 
1 Sep: Observer runs story about pupil with 
previous 'A's getting unclassified grades 
6 Sep: 2 Scottish Parliament Committees 
(Education, Culture & Sport and Enterprise 
and Lifelong Learning) announce inquiries 
mid-Sep: QCA orders OCR to report 
findings of internal inquiry 
20 Sep: Completion of results of urgent 
appeals (for university or college entry)  
20 Sep: terms of reference of Tomlinson 
inquiry into A level standards announced 
 24 Sep: new chief exec of QCA reports that 
only 979 OCR candidates have AAU 
profiles (0.5%) 
 27 Sep: Tomlinson interim report published, 
recommending regrading of some A2 units. 
Chair of QCA 'resigns' 
 14 Oct: Report on Outcomes of Review of 
A-Level Grading: 9,800 candidate entries in 
18 units had unit grades changes (all OCR). 
1,1945 received at least one revised A/AS  
level grade (of whom 168 eligible to switch 
to first choice university) 
31 Oct: Deloitte Touche Report published 24 Oct: Estelle Morris resigns as Education 
Secretary. New QCA chair announced 
  2 Dec: Tomlinson Final Report published 
 
 
ended, perhaps to allay recurrent public and media concerns about alleged devaluation 
of A-Level standards (see Education Guardian 2002; Lightfoot 2005). A later report 
by a former senior civil servant identified some 104 individual units or modules 
where such interventions had apparently occurred, leading to a re-grading exercise for 
over 300,000 entries submitted by 91,525 candidates. Some 9,800 candidates (out of a 
total of 258,000) had their grades within units (that is, components of their courses) 
improved after this re-grading exercise. Of those, 1,945 candidates (2.1 per cent of 
those re-graded) received higher overall exam grades in their university entrance AS 
and A-Level examinations (see Tomlinson 2002, Introduction para 10). The grades 
that proved to be problematic were concentrated in only one of the three English 
examination boards, namely OCR (the Oxford, Cambridge and RSA Board), for 
which 29 per cent of total entries submitted were corrected in the re-grading exercise.  
 
Those numbers suggest that the relative scale of the problem in England, in terms of 
the proportion of school-leaver candidates eventually found to be affected by faulty 
exam grading, was considerably smaller than applied to the Scottish case. Moreover, 
in sharp contrast to the Scottish case, the number of candidates eventually found to be 
wrongly graded in England was smaller rather than larger than the early official 
estimates had suggested. However, as we shall see shortly, the political consequences 
were if anything greater in the English case. Furthermore, the details set out above 
were not known at the time when the grading problems first came to light and the 
media firestorm was at its height. For some time, there was uncertainty about the 
number of candidates affected, and the effect on their prospects for university 
entrance were unknown - leading to a high level of anxiety and public recrimination 
in both cases. 
 
For this analysis, the ‘heat’ coming onto the relevant officeholders from the media in 
the aftermath of the exam crises was explored by identifying all the stories appearing 
in a set of six major newspapers (detailed in Appendix 2) for each day of 
approximately one hundred days4 after the relevant exams results were announced, 
and grading each of those day’s stories according to a ‘blame thermometer’ to reflect 
the degree of blame they represented. The ‘blame thermometer’ that was used is 
shown in Appendix 3, and it represents an attempt to describe a spectrum running 
from a wholly benign environment when even the ‘usual suspect’ opponents of a 
government or officeholder show support for their policies and actions to, at the 
opposite extreme, a position in which even the corresponding ‘usual suspect’ 
supporters, such as cronies and ‘payroll voters’, have turned hostile and are calling for 
officeholders’ resignations. Accordingly, Figure 3 (page 13) shows the ‘blame 
pattern’ represented by each of these cases, as a product of the number of stories and 
the level of blame they involved. As can be seen, there were significantly more press 
stories about the Scottish exam fiasco than the corresponding English one (431 
against 231), and higher proportionate levels of blame, though both cases attracted 
substantial media coverage. The old adage that ‘the fire that burns half as long burns 
twice as bright’ does not seem quite to apply here. It is true that the shorter-lived 
English media blaze did burn more brightly than its Scottish counterpart for a short 
period and it is also true that in both cases, the storm was at its height for a few 
                                                 
4 . Though ‘a hundred days’ is a much-invoked unit of political time, we took that only as an 
approximate guide to the duration of the ‘blame episode’ in these cases, as Figure 3 shows. In both 
cases ‘day 1’ represents the day on which the exam results were announced, and the analysis is 
extended to the final point of significant press coverage approximately 100 days out from day 1.  
 8
weeks, represented by the product of high press coverage and a high proportion of 
‘top-blame-level’ stories. But as Figure 3 shows, there were subsequent flare-ups and 
aftershocks reflecting the reporting of inquiries, legislative debates and committee 
hearings.   
 
Against the development of the media firestorms represented by Figure 3, what were 
the responses of the high officeholders in the relevant governments? In this analysis 
the responses of two sets of officeholders were explored (Figure 4, page 14). One was 
that of the education ministers in the parliamentary government systems involved. In 
the English case, it was the education minister in the Westminster parliament, Estelle 
Morris, who resigned on day 71 after exam results came out (the Prime Minister, 
Tony Blair, offered a public apology on day 50 but the education minister continued 
to blame ‘the system’ at that point). In the Scottish case, the ministers concerned were 
members of the Scottish Executive who had been elected in the previous year when a 
separate legislature for Scotland was established to supersede the previous structure of 
administrative devolution to a set of offices headed by a UK cabinet minister. 
Responsibility for the Scottish Qualifications Authority (the body that administered 
the exams) turned out to be ambiguously determined between the ‘Lifelong Learning’ 
minister and the education minister. The former minister offered a public apology on 
days 13 and 14 of the firestorm but did not resign; the latter, Sam Galbraith, was 
moved sideways (to Environment) in a reshuffle on day 82 of the firestorm, and the 
new education minister, Jack McConnell, proceeded to sack the members of the 
Scottish Qualifications Authority board immediately after his appointment.  
 
The other set of officeholders examined in this analysis were those in the exam 
bureaucracies concerned, comprising examination boards and exam regulation 
bodies.5 The structure of these bodies was subtly different between the two countries, 
but in ways that are quite important for ‘agency strategies’ for blame-avoidance. In 
Scotland, there was a single examination body (the Scottish Qualifications Authority, 
as already mentioned), whose chief executive resigned on day 3 of the firestorm, 
leaving ministers with no-one else to fire (until the members of the SQA board were 
sacked on day 87). In the English case, there was a double-decker structure, 
comprising both a number of examination boards responsible for organizing the 
grading of the exams, and a regulatory structure (the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Authority) to oversee the exam boards. The education minister sacked the head of the 
QCA on day 45 (who proceeded to deny responsibility and attack his former boss). 
But the head of the examination board principally involved, the OCR, remained in 
office and did not accept personal responsibility for the problems at any point.6  
 
To explore the responses of those two sets of officeholders systematically over the 
period of the two firestorms, we categorized the responses of each set of officeholders 
to each of the stories that were shown in Figure 3. Their responses were categorized 
into the three types (with the nine sub-types) described in Appendix 1 and 
summarized in Figure 2, and we analyzed the time-distribution of those responses 
across the approximately 100 days of firestorm in each case. We then explored the 
                                                 
5 . In principle we might also extend the analysis to the bureaucrats in the ministerial departments, but 
in practice these actors were not readily identifiable in the analysis described below. 
 
6 . Indeed, the minister had no legal powers to dismiss him, since OCR is not formally a public sector 
body. 
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pattern of those responses in two ways. One was to see how far officeholder responses 
over time corresponded to the ‘staged-retreat’ pattern, as discussed in the previous 
section. The other was to explore the relationship between officeholders’ responses on 
one day and the level of blame appearing in the press on subsequent days, to see how 
far those responses were followed by a calming or an exacerbation of the firestorm.     
 
 
Results 
 
Figure 4 (page 14) shows the time-pattern of responses for ministers as a group in the 
two countries and for the exam bureaucracies – the Scottish Qualifications Authority 
in the Scottish case and the Examination Boards (chiefly OCR) and Qualifications and 
Curriculum Authority in the English case. Appendix 4 breaks those responses down 
further into the nine sub-categories identified in Figure 2.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 (pages 15 and 16) superimpose those responses onto the chart of 
media ‘firestorms’ shown in Figure 3 for the ministerial actors and the bureaucracies 
respectively. To show the pattern diagrammatically on a single page, we have 
excluded the numerous ‘no response’ days in the run of approximately one hundred 
days selected for each case. So the figures represent days of action only.  However, in 
the analysis we also considered ‘no response’ as a strategic choice, as will be 
discussed shortly.  
 
As far as education ministers’ responses are concerned, Figures 4 and 5 and Appendix 
4 show that in neither case did the pattern of response exactly fit the simple ‘staircase’ 
progression – or ‘staged retreat’ hypothesis – that was portrayed in Figure 2.  But, 
there are key parts of the action that approximate to that progression, for example the 
Scottish pattern from day 28 to the end and the English pattern from day 34 to 40, 41 
to 45 and 46 to 71. The opening pattern of the action sequence (which, as already 
noted, began much later after results came out in England than in Scotland) is much 
messier than the ‘staircase progression’ depicted in Figure 2 suggested, with 
announcement of inquiries (B2) in both cases coming before problem denial, and 
responses including elements of C2 (announcements of organizational remedies short 
of resignation) occurred early in the sequence – before the first problem denial 
response in Scotland and shortly after it in England. In Scotland, as already noted, the 
head of the exam bureaucracy resigned very early in the picture, on day 3, and by then 
ministers had already announced an inquiry (on day –1), meaning that they had run 
out of their heaviest blame-avoidance ammunition early in the sequence. Moreover, in 
both cases there are signs of a double cycle as the stories and the blaming went on, 
with a new cycle starting in Scotland at about day 28 – after the resignation of the top 
exam bureaucrat on day 3 and the eventual acceptance by the “Lifelong Learning” 
minister of responsibility for the actions of the SQA on days 13 and 14 - and in 
England at about day 51 - after the head of the English QCA had been sacked and 
produced damaging allegations about ministerial involvement which required a new 
round of defensive responses. There were evidently ‘aftershock’ responses too, 
particularly in the English case where the discovery that the number of students 
affected seemed to be smaller than had originally been supposed opened the door to a 
new round of problem denial on day 85 and 94 to 97. 
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However, if we step back from such details, the broader observed pattern does fit the 
expected one in some important ways. As Figure 4 and Appendix 4 show, from the 
outset of the relevant ‘firestorm’ it took 14 days in Scotland for ministers to adopt a 
‘C3’ response (that is, a relatively full admission of both problem and responsibility), 
and in England it took 18 days after the commencement of the firestorm. In both 
cases, Figure 4 shows that C3 comes after various blame-avoidance responses of 
types A and B, and in the very broad sense fit the idea of a ‘staged retreat.’ In 
England, ministerial resignation only came after all the alternative responses (as 
described in Figure 2) had been used. In Scotland there was no ministerial resignation 
(as explained, the Lifelong Learning minister took responsibility but did not resign 
and the education minister did not resign either, but was eventually reshuffled late in 
the sequence), but here too we see all of the other types of responses deployed by 
ministers, with the sole exception of B3 (that is, acceptance of only minor or technical 
responsibility).   
 
Turning to the analysis shown in Figure 6 (with further detail in Appendix 4), 
exploring the responses of the examination bureaucracies against the media heat in the 
two cases, we can see that the Scottish Qualifications Authority had many more ‘days 
of action’ than its English counterparts. We can also see that the SQA’s responses 
covered the whole range included in Figure 2, in several iterations – perhaps 
reflecting the greater seriousness of the problem in the Scottish case and the much 
higher level of media coverage. In contrast to the ministers of the Scottish Executive, 
the SQA from day 1 (actually from day –2!) made responses at the third level 
represented in Figure 2 – that is, admission of both problem and responsibility, with 
six days of ‘C3’ responses – including the resignation of the head of the body on day 
3 - in contrast to three days of such responses by Scottish Executive ministers. This 
bureaucracy evidently ‘took the rap’ from the outset. By contrast, the equivalent 
English bureaucracies seem to show a less extreme and certainly less drawn-out 
pattern of response. As can be seen from Figure 6 and Appendix 4, the English QCA 
responded largely with variants of problem denial, with only eight days of responses 
that acknowledged a problem but denied responsibility, and no C-type responses at all 
(as explained, the head of the QCA was sacked by the minister on day 45, but did not 
resign and did not accept responsibility for the problems, so we did not count that as a 
C3 response). Even OCR, the English exam board in which a substantial number of 
grades in the affected subjects turned out to be wrong, showed far less in the way of 
penitential C-type responses than the SQA (a total of 5 days compared to 31) and 
never reached the stage of C3 at all. 
 
From this analysis, we might conclude that the ‘staircase’ pattern of response depicted 
in Figure 2 works much less well as a description of the observed pattern for the 
bureaucracies concerned. In the case of the SQA, the organization seems to have 
started the action at both ends of the staircase, contrary to prediction (mixing calming 
noises with apology and resignation right at the outset), and thereafter moved in ways 
that roughly approximated the ‘staged-retreat’ pattern, for instance between days 23 
and 85. In the English case, the QCA chose to stay on the higher part of the staircase 
throughout, never descending beyond the second landing as it were, and even the 
OCR exam board had relatively few days of action, in a sequence that does not 
obviously fit the ‘staircase’ hypothesis.  
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A further question that can be explored from this pattern of responses concerns the 
relationship between officeholders’ responses at any point in the firestorm, and 
subsequent developments in the firestorm. We have to be careful about attributing 
causality in complex conditions where many things are happening simultaneously, but 
it is illuminating to see whether there is any connection between responses to blame at 
one point in time and the level of blame that develops at the next point in time. And 
indeed, such an analysis in these two cases raises some puzzling issues about common 
propositions in the blame-avoidance literature.  
 
To explore further the impact (or lack thereof) of the presentational strategies for 
handling blame described earlier, time series intervention analysis (Box and Tiao 
1975) is used to estimate the effect of discrete events in the presence of noise7. This 
technique helps distinguish deterministic from stochastic variations in a series with a 
high degree of confidence. The method is appropriate for this analysis, because what 
is of interest here is the effect that presentational strategies adopted by officeholders 
(ministers, in this instance) on a particular day have on the blame level the following 
day, independent of other effects arising from relationships between blame levels at 
different points in time. Thus, it restricts specification of the models to pulse inputs  
(i.e. the temporary, next day impact of the strategies of officeholders). 8
 
Consider, for example, the analogy between a blame firestorm and the development of 
a real firestorm. In the latter case, if we want to evaluate the impact of interventions 
by a fire crew (such as turning on water hoses or creating fire breaks) on the 
development of a fire over time, we need to control for the inherent dynamics of fire, 
such as increasing blaze while the combustible material lasts and a dying away as the 
fire runs out of fuel, plus other variables such as rain or wind speed and direction. The 
observed size of that firestorm, at a given point in time, is also subject to random 
fluctuations (i.e. ‘noise’). In this case, those presentational strategies available to 
officeholders are equivalent to the repertoire of actions a fire crew might undertake, 
while the next day's level of the blame thermometer is equivalent to the size and 
intensity of a fire the following day.  
 
The Box-Tiao method is premised upon systematic and iterative specification of a 
model that is consistent with a defined theory of causation. Thus, it is postulated that 
certain strategies were - on the surface at least - integral to dynamics of blame in each 
of the cases. Table 2 reports the effects of recorded interventions in each 'blame game' 
that were tested in order to construct final, reduced versions of the Box-Tiao models. 
The parameter estimates and diagnostic statistics for both models are reported in 
Table 3. To start with, the Scottish Higher and A-Level blame series are estimated  
                                                 
7 It is possible to express a model, adapted from Hibbs (1977) and Moe (1982), of dynamic responses 
of the blame thermometer (Yt) to interventions by officeholders (X1, t−n1 , X2, t−n2 , … Xj, t−nj ) of the form: 
µ
B)(B)(1
θ(B)aθ
Xω...XωXωY
d
t0
njtj,jn2t2,2n1t1,1t +−
+++++= −−− ϕ .  That is where ωj is the weighting of an 
intervention Xj at a lag of t − nj, at is white noise disturbances, φ is the autoregressive noise parameter, 
θ is the moving average parameter, θ0 is the deterministic trend, d is the degree of differencing required 
to achieve stationarity, B is the backshift operator where Yt = BYt−1, and µ is the mean or level of the 
series. 
8  This indicates that an intervention is temporary at time tj, such that   ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ =
≠=
j
j
j t tif  1 
t tif  0 
X
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with Box-Jenkins methodology as an autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) (1,0,0), i.e. AR(1), process (Box-Jenkins 1970). This implies that each 
observation consists of an autoregressive component capturing the effects of past 
observations(φ), plus a random error component (at). There is no moving average 
component (θ),  which means that errors do not persist in either series. Thus, random 
fluctuations do not cause the ‘blame game’ to spiral out of control. Also, both series 
are found to be stationary with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test, so there is 
no evidence of an underlying trend in patterns of blame (i.e. differencing is not 
required).  
 
The related coefficients reported in Table 3 are helpful for understanding the 
conditions for blame management faced by officeholders in Scotland and England. 
First, the weight of the autoregressive component for the English case (0.86***) is 
greater than for the Scottish case (0.58***). In practice, this means that past 
observations are a superior predictor of the present in dynamics of blame for the A-
Level fiasco. Second, the white noise disturbances component, which captures the 
random volatility of each series, is greater in the Scottish case (15.23***) than in the 
English (9.90***) case. Third, at the same time the mean level of blame (µ) for the 
Scottish Highers fiasco (17.71***) is significant, unlike its English counterpart. Thus, 
it appears that blame is more persistent at a higher level (albeit with a higher degree of 
stochastic variation). As such, the dynamic of the blame game for A-Levels is more 
sporadic - with brief outbreaks of blaming - and does not revert to a status quo that is 
significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. For these reasons, we can surmise that 
blame today tended to be more strongly related to blame yesterday in the English 
case, and was also less volatile, perhaps creating more scope for blame management 
than in Scotland.  
 
Indeed, what this analysis shows is that none of the key interventions in the Scottish 
case was correlated at the 95 per cent confidence level with alterations in the next 
day's blame level on the blame thermometer, suggesting that - outside the estimated 
autoregressive and noise components of the series - nothing the officeholders did in 
the way of response acted as either petrol or water on the flames. By contrast, Table 2 
shows that in the English case seven out of twelve interventions are correlated at the 
95 per cent confidence level with changes in the next day's blame level. Out of those 
seven cases, the correlation runs in the wrong direction for two of them (suggesting 
those interventions, both attempts at instant rebuttal, worked as petrol on the flames) 
and in the anticipated water-on-flames direction for five. Out of those five, all except 
one (on day 46) involved the C2 strategy of admission of both problem and 
responsibility coupled with apology and/or institutional remedial action.  
 
This analysis suggests intriguing differences between the Scottish and English pattern, 
and further suggests that some commonly advanced propositions about the effect of 
various presentational strategies for handling blame require further attention. For 
those like Bovens et al. (1999), who claim that presentational strategies can be an 
effective alternative to “agency strategies” in the handling of blame, the apparent lack 
of impact of any of the interventions tested in the Scottish case on the next day’s 
blame level, presents something of a challenge. Even in the English case, less than 
half of the interventions tested appear to have had a water-on-flames impact, and 
ironically the only full C3 ministerial response – full admission of culpability and 
T
able 2. Interventions (Scotland and England) 
(a) Scotland, H
ighers, 2000 
D
escription 
 
 
D
ay
Strategy
T
ype 
E
ffect? 
1: M
inister announces inquiry, prom
ises 
rem
edy etc 
1 
A
2, B
1, C
1, 
C
2 
N
o 
2: D
rop from
 C
1 to A
2 blam
e strategy 
2 
A
2 
N
o 
3: Jum
p from
 A
2 to B
2 and refusal to resign 
9 
B
2 
N
o  
4: M
inister refuses to resign, states he w
ill stay 
to sort out the m
ess 
13 
A
2, A
3, B
2 
N
o 
5: M
inister refuses to go, w
ill give statem
ent to 
Parliam
ent in appropriate tim
e for debate   
20 
A
1, A
2, A
3, 
C
2 
N
o 
6:  M
inister plays dow
n extent of problem
  
23 
A
2 
N
o 
7: M
inister apologizes, blam
es SQ
A
, problem
 
being resolved, no case for  m
inisters to 
answ
er 
28 
A
2, B
2, C
2 
N
o  
8: R
eserved response (can’t reveal 
inform
ation) 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
1
N
o
9: M
inister adm
its problem
 but says 
responsibility lim
ited/partial 
49
B
2, B
3
N
o
10: Shift from
 A
3/B
1 to C
1 
53 
C
1 
N
o 
11: D
ay the report com
es out: no response 
M
inisters leave it to the SQ
A
 etc to respond 
88
-
N
o
 
(b) England, A
-Levels, 2003 
D
escription 
 
D
ay
Strategy
T
ype 
E
ffect? 
1: M
inister denies responsibility and refuses 
independent inquiry 
35 
 
 
A
1
Y
es (but
w
rong 
direction!) 
2: M
inister rejects reissue of grades but orders 
partial rem
arking, denies allegations of having 
interfered in the process 
36 
A
1, C
2 
Y
es  (but 
w
rong 
direction!) 
3: M
inister prom
ises rem
edy. launches 
independent inquiry into Q
C
A
 etc 
37 
A
1, B
3, C
2 
Y
es 
4: M
inister denies interference, blam
es Q
C
A
 
39 
A
1, C
2 
Y
es 
5: M
inister denies involvem
ent, offers to 
disclose m
inutes 
40 
A
1, C
2 
Y
es (90%
 
confidence 
level) 
6: M
inister re-prom
ises rem
edy and 
disciplinary action 
44 
A
1, B
1, C
2 
N
o 
7: M
inister sacks exam
 regulator, prom
ises 
regrading and new
 university places for 
affected students 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
2
N
o
8: M
inister counter-attacks Stubbs’ com
plaints 
46 
A
3 
Y
es 
9: M
inister and junior m
inister blam
e Q
C
A
, 
deny responsibility 
51
B
2
N
o
10: M
inister re-re-prom
ises rem
edy, financial 
help to universitiess, secure places etc. 
63
C
2
Y
es
11: M
inister resigns, accepts full responsibility 
71 
C
3 
N
o 
12: R
ebuttal of exam
 regulator’s allegations 
85 
A
1 
N
o 
Table 3. Effects of blame management  
(a) Scotland, Highers 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable (Xt) 
   Blame V2 
Noise Components and Diagnostics    
ARIMA   (1,0,0) 
Autoregressive (φ)    0.58*** (0.09) 
Moving Average (θ)    - 
Mean (µ)   17.71*** (4.81) 
White Noise Disturbances (at)    15.23*** (1.24) 
Note: OLS regression coefficients, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) with 
standard errors in parentheses.  
 
(b) England, A-Levels 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable (Xt) 
 Parameter Day Blame V2 
Intervention 1 (I1) ω1 35 28.66*** (5.28) 
Intervention 2 (I2) ω2 36 34.08***  (5.32) 
Intervention 3 (I3) ω3 37 -38.03*** (3.93) 
Intervention 4 (I4) ω4 39 -43.82*** (4.31) 
Intervention 5 (I5) ω5 40 -9.09** (3.72) 
Intervention 6 (I6) ω6 46 -27.69*** (9.73)  
Intervention 7 (I7) ω7 63 -15.92*** (5.33) 
Noise Components and Diagnostics    
ARIMA   (1,0,0) 
Autoregressive (φ)    0.86*** (0.04) 
Moving Average (θ)    - 
Mean (µ)   9.22 (9.74) 
White Noise Disturbances (at)    9.80*** (0.48) 
Note: OLS regression coefficients, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) with 
standard errors in parentheses.  
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resignation – is not one of them. If, as conventional wisdom often has it, politicians 
live from day-to-day and are only concerned with the following day’s headlines, it 
therefore seems that the ‘long grass’ effect does not always come into play 
immediately, and it may be that in some cases the ‘long grass’ is more about 
postponing condemnation by legislative committees, audit bodies and the like rather 
than silencing the media. 
 
Further, this analysis suggests that the relative payoff for beleaguered office-holders 
of doing something rather than doing nothing was rather different in the two cases. 
‘Don’t just stand there, do something,’ is a common saying in a crisis, but equally it is 
often said that ill-judged interventions to try and calm things down can lead, 
unintentionally, to intensifying the problem. Table 4 compares the payoff of any 
action on the part of officeholders (that is, any of the blame management strategies 
analyzed earlier) as against no action in the two cases. What it suggests is that ‘Don’t 
just stand there, do something’ was, on balance, more likely to produce a reduction in 
the next day’s blame level than a strategy of no response for all the actors in Table 4 
except the English QCA. But this ‘headless chicken’ bias was much stronger for the 
English education minister than for her Scottish equivalent, who was apparently more 
in a ‘damned if you do and damned if you don’t’ position – in line with the results of 
the ‘nothing works’ intervention models reported above.  
 
Table 4: ‘Don’t Just Stand There, Do Something!’ Action Versus Inaction and 
Next Day’s Blame Level 
 
(Percentage of next day's press articles assigning more or less blame, or showing no 
change - divided into instances where organizations did or did not take action.  “No 
Change” is taken to be equal to or less than 2 ‘blame points’.) 
 
  Education Ministers  Exam Bureaucracies 
   Scotland England   SQA English 
Exam 
Boards 
QCA 
Less Blame 42% 50%  52% 54% 33% 
No Change 25% 41%  26% 23% 33%  Did take 
action More Blame 33% 9%  21% 23% 33% 
Number of articles 35 24  41 13 15 
          
Less Blame 11% 2%  15% 10% 8% 
No Change 69% 87%  52% 76% 87% 
Did not 
take 
action More Blame 19% 11%  32% 14% 5% 
Number of articles 78 89  72 100 98 
 
 
Discussion 
 
What conclusions can we draw from this analysis? One is that the ‘staged-retreat 
hypothesis’ described earlier and set out in Figure 2 is evidently not a universal or 
mechanical pattern followed by beleaguered ministers and officials, in spite of the 
analytic appeal of ‘blame-avoidance’.  The broad stages posited in Figure 2 did not 
fully predict the pattern of response to the fiascos, and in both cases B-type responses 
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(admitting there was a problem but not responsibility, particularly by appointing an 
inquiry) came very early in the sequence. The pattern, particularly in the opening 
stages, was quite varied, producing the impression of a scatter-gun response rather 
than the clear sort of ‘staged retreat’ hypothesized in Figure 2. Nevertheless, for 
ministers at least, the idea that admission of personal responsibility as well as 
acknowledgement of a problem, comes only (if it comes at all) after a variety of other 
responses have been adopted, is generally consistent with the pattern of responses in 
both of these cases. 
 
The messier-than-expected observed response might be accounted for in at least three 
ways. One is that in cases of this type, personalities and individual styles of 
officeholders may better account for the variation in responses than the abstract logic 
of their political positions. For example, if Estelle Morris, the Education Minister in 
England in 2002, and Sam Galbraith, the Education Minister in Scotland in 2000, had 
swapped places, we might well have seen differences in the observed pattern of 
responses in more than detail. While institutionalists insist that institutions matter in 
politics, individuals matter as well, and only an extension of this sort of analysis to 
many other cases could indicate how much variation might be accounted for by the 
particular individuals concerned.  
 
Second, as already mentioned, it seems entirely plausible that in some circumstances 
the ‘problem denial’ stage of politico-bureaucratic response may simply be untenable 
from the outset, for instance in cases of major terrorist attack. The Scottish case, 
where substantial numbers of exam grades were simply missing from the outset might 
well be considered a fiasco of that type, in which B-type responses come into play at 
once, and there is no real possibility for a ‘problem denial’ stage9.  
 
A third possible way to explain the apparently messy pattern of observed response, 
especially in the opening stages of the firestorm, may be that blame of officials (C1-2) 
may come earlier in the sequence of responses than Figure 2 suggests, and in both 
cases there was a complex bureaucratic structure that made such a response possible. 
In both cases ministers took an early stance of blaming the delegated administrative 
bodies involved, and such responses, especially when accompanied by resignations, 
early retirements or dismissals, do seem to have been followed by at least a short-
lived reduction in the heat of the firestorm. 
 
Another broad conclusion is that the method followed here merits extension and 
development. Mapping out a sequence of responses against media heat during a 
defined period offers a way of comparing officeholder responses to blame firestorms 
that is a way of organizing the conventional case-narrative approach, lends itself to 
the method of time series intervention analysis and allows for readier and more 
systematic comparison across jurisdictions - although the coding of responses 
inevitably involves some tricky judgement calls. In this case, comparing fairly similar 
cases relatively close in time, between two contiguous countries or states that are part 
of the same overall jurisdiction and institutional tradition enables the analysis to focus 
on relatively fine differences in patterns of response. But the method is also applicable 
                                                 
9 . The practical obstacles to the sequencing of a staged-retreat might be compared with the difficulties 
of ‘street-level’ escalation in the form proposed by theories of responsive regulation (see Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite 2002).  
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in principle to comparisons of firestorms in very different institutional systems and at 
quite different points in time.   
 
A third broad conclusion is that this analysis raises some rather basic questions about 
at least two standard assumptions in the blame-avoidance literature. One, as already 
mentioned, is the conventional assumption that the establishment of inquiries allow 
officeholders to damp down blame firestorms for a time.  In both cases observed here, 
the establishment of an inquiry seemed to have relatively little effect on the blaze in 
the short term. It is, however, true that in neither case was a public inquiry of a fully 
independent judicial type established, and it may be that inquiries of the independent 
and judicial type might have had more of a discernable ‘long grass’ effect than 
seemed to apply here.  
 
The other question raised by this analysis relates to an equally conventional 
assumption in blame-avoidance analysis, namely that administrative delegation can 
help to shield ministers from political heat when administrative fiascos come to light. 
That assumption would lead us to expect the ability for ministers to avoid having to 
make C3 responses to be conditioned by the extent to which they had delegated 
responsibility in advance, in a way that allowed them to blame or fire those delegatees 
when trouble struck. But in this case, the ministerial survival rate was no better in the 
country  in which delegation was more extensive (England) than in the country where 
there were fewer delegates to blame and fire when the heat came on (Scotland). And 
that, added to the wide variety of outcomes in the relationship between types of 
blame-avoidance response and the blame level in the following day’s media stories, 
suggests that blame-avoidance is as yet a far-from-determinate science.  
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Appendix 1: Some Basic Strategic Options for Officeholders Facing Media 
Firestorms: Denial and Admission of Problem and Responsibility 
 
A: Problem Denial B: Problem Admission but 
Responsibility Denial 
C: Problem and Responsibility 
Admission 
   
1. Pure denial ('crisis, what 
crisis?') 
1. Open stance on who is 
responsible (announce or agree to 
investigation to determine who is 
responsible, without accepting 
responsibility) 
1. Explanation-only response, 
offering some account of what 
went wrong, but not accepting 
culpability 
2. Qualified denial (admission 
that there is some problem but 
denial that it is serious or 
significant, e.g. through 
justificatory arguments) 
2. Assert others to be responsible 
(blame victims, other agents, 
predecessors, successors, 
subordinates, super-ordinates, 
colleagues, etc.) 
2. Institutional action-taking 
response, offering institutional 
apology, compensation, remedial 
action (e.g. dismissal or 
disciplining of subordinates) 
3. Denial plus counter-attack 
(portrayal of critics as whingers, 
knockers, politically motivated 
etc., assertion that onus of proof 
rests on critics, threats of 
lawsuits, dismissals of moles and 
leakers, and other sanctions) 
3. Admission of some 
responsibility, but denial of 
major or ultimate responsibility 
(e.g. by offering 'wrong kind of 
snow' excuses or admission of 
only partial or 'technical' but not 
substantial responsibility) 
3. Admission of personal 
culpability (e.g. offer act of 
penance or resignation) 
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Appendix 2: Newspapers Analyzed for ‘Media Heat’ 
 
i) Newspapers by Circulation 
 
Name     Circulation 
 
Scotland: 
 
Herald     71,689 
Sunday Herald   54,625 
Evening News1   56,135 
Daily Record    412,563 
The Scotsman    60,088 
Scotland on Sunday   74,362 
 
England: 
 
The Times    638,451 
Sunday Times    1,140,467 
Evening Standard   289,254 
The Guardian    335,317 
The Observer    402,665 
Daily Mail    2,212,727 
 
Figures represent average net circulation for period 28 August –1 October 2006 
(www.abc.org.uk) except: 
1 www.nsdatabase.co.uk 1 March 2006 
 
ii) Number and Length of Articles on Exam Crises by Newspaper 
 
Number of Articles by Length (relative to individual newspaper) 
     
 High Average Low Total 
     
Scotland (10th August 2000-29th November 2000) 
Herald 53 92 22 167 
Sunday Herald 5 12 2 19 
Evening News 11 34 19 64 
Daily Record 9 42 7 58 
The Scotsman 25 74 8 107 
Scotland on Sunday 2 9 5 16 
   Total 431 
     
England (14th  August 2002-4th December 2002) 
The Times 11 46 7 64 
Sunday Times 7 7 1 15 
Evening Standard 12 24 7 43 
The Guardian 23 32 - 55 
The Observer 5 6 1 12 
Daily Mail 23 16 3 42 
   Total 231 
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Appendix 3: A ‘Blame Barometer’ Used for Coding Daily Media Stories 
 
Level General description Salience Stance of 'usual 
suspects' (habitual 
opponents) 
Typical accountability 
calls on responsible 
officeholders 
     
1. Very 
calm or 
fair 
Either benign neglect 
or favourable 
reactions from media, 
legislature and other 
forums 
High and 
favourable or 
low and 
neutral 
Muted Either low or as 
objects of praise 
     
2. Fairly 
calm 
Broadly favourable, 
with criticisms in the 
form of 'background 
noise' in isolated 
sources with limited 
coverage 
Low and 
fairly neutral 
Point scoring at fairly 
low level 
Some calls for 
information or 
explanation 
     
3. Mid-
range 
Mixed coverage, with 
criticisms given 
moderate attention in 
mainstream forums 
Medium and 
mixed 
Active, with limited 
criticism coming from 
neutrals and 
supporters too 
Calls for serious 
inquiries, special 
debates etc. as well as 
explanations 
     
4. Stormy Largely negative 
points given 
substantial coverage 
in mainstream sources 
Medium to 
high and 
mainly 
negative 
Joined by non-trivial 
criticism from the 
ranks of normal 
loyalists 
Calls for independent 
inquiries and 
remedies as well as 
explanations 
     
5. Very 
stormy 
Overwhelmingly 
negative points given 
saturation coverage, 
with 'legs' (that is, 
expectations of 
continuance) 
High and 
negative 
Overshadowed by 
critics drawn from 
normal loyalists and 
payroll supporters 
Calls for resignations 
as well as remedies 
etc 
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